Post by sometimeman on Jun 6, 2008 7:04:01 GMT -4
Sorry, Folks, this is a bit long, but you need to know the truth about Joe Campbell, and more importantly, about the State Bar of Georgia as a co-conspirator in the concealing of criminal activity of malfeasant lawyers.
Please keep in mind as you read this that at no time did the SBofGa allow me to speak verbally, nor did it permit me to present the evidence or witnesses to prove that Joe Campbell had committed two felonies! The SBofGa denied me, and many others, of the right to due process and denied you the right to the evidence of any man in our society!
These documents have been concealed from your knowledge by state law. It is past time that you now know the truth regardless of what happens to me.
========================================
Paul L. Nally
3667 Reinhardt College Parkway
Pine Log, Georgia 30171-1302
Pln@innerx.net
(770) 386-1171
April 29, 2000
Ms. Kellyn 0. McGee
State Bar of Georgia
Office of The General Counsel
800 The Hurt Building
50 Hurt Plaza
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Ms. McGee:
Please find enclosed my grievance form and averment in the matter of Mr. T. Joseph Campbell, Esq., District Attorney, Cherokee Judicial Circuit, Georgia.
Also, could you please explain the reason for the various provisions of the Canon of Ethics containing discipline statements if the inquiry of the State Bar is restricted to the seventy-four standards of conduct.
Should anyone desire that this averment be sworn or require an interview, please let me know and I will make arrangements to be at their pleasure.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Paul L. Nally
Enc.
cc: Joseph Campbell
James E. Jarrett
========================================
STATE BAR OF GEORGIA
GRIEVANCE
Please type or print legibly.
YOUR NAME: _______________Paul L. Nally________________________
MAILING ADDRESS: _3667 Hwy 140 NE___Rydal____Georgia____30171-1302_
Street or P. 0. Box City State Zip
YOUR PHONE NUMBERS: (W) ______(770) 387-3679__________________
(H) ___(770) 386-1171_____________________
NAME OF THE ATTORNEY: _____Mr.. T. Joseph Campbell_________________
Fill out a separate form for each attorney. Do not list law firms.
ADDRESS OF THE ATTORNEY: ___135 W. Cherokee Ave. Suite 368 Cartersville, Georgia 30120______
State what the attorney has done or has not done which causes you to fill out this report
________1. Discourteous conduct before the Grand Jury, April Session_______
_________________________________________________________________
If more space is needed, please attach other pages. Please do not write on the back.
Return to:
State Bar of Georgia
SIGNATURE; ____(Signed by Paul Nally)___
========================================
A v e r m e n t
IN RE Joseph Campbell
In the matter of a criminal investigation performed by Paul L. Nally, proceeding under color of law pursuant to the authority of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, Art. I, Sec. I, par. XII, Mr. Joseph Campbell, District Attorney for the Cherokee Judicial Circuit has committed a breach of the Standards of Conduct of the State Bar of Georgia, to wit:
Discourteous conduct before a judicial tribunal.
On April 24, 2000, Paul L. Nally met with the District Attorney, Mr. T. Joseph Campbell, at about 8:50 AM in the foyer of the District Attorney's offices at the courthouse in Cartersville, Georgia.
In this meeting Nally informed Mr. Campbell of his desire to meet with the Grand Jury for the purpose of proceeding with the prosecution of a criminal matter involving the members of the Bartow County Board of Education under O.C.G.A. 16-10-1, Willful Violation of Official Oath of Office and requested that he so inform the Grand Jury.
Upon hearing Nally's statement, Mr. Campbell informed Nally that he had already seen Nally's paperwork (non of which was provided directly by Nally) and that Nally did not have a criminal case and, further, Nally needed to proceed in the Superior Court with a Mandamus. He further stated that he was the official legal advisor to the Grand Jury and that he would inform them of Nally's request, but that he would also inform them of his position on the matter. Nally then left.
It should be noted that the only "paperwork" he could have possibly had in his possession would have been a copy of Nally's affidavit alleging the elements of the crime and not the evidentiary material which was to be submitted to the Grand Jury in support thereof. A copy of the affidavit and the statutorily required notice to public officers had been mailed to all named defendants of the Local Board of Education.
On Tuesday afternoon, about 5:10 PM, Mr. Campbell called Nally at home to advise him that he had so informed the Grand Jury and that they had agreed with his position and had taken the position that there was no criminal matter into which they needed to inquire. Therefore no need existed for them to meet with Nally during this term.
Neither Mr. Campbell nor the Grand Jury provided Nally with notice that the matter was to be considered at any date certain, therefore Nally had no proper due process opportunity to present any argument as to the merits of having his case heard.
Such blatant and inexcusable conduct on the part of this District Attorney in this particular matter is, at least, a clear contravention of Standard 50. Said conduct is a discourteous act to both the Grand Jury, which was sitting as constitutional judges in a tribunal under the authority of the Constitution of Georgia, Art. I, Sec. I, para. XI(a), and Nally, the victim of the criminal conduct. This conduct is also a tyrannical abuse of the power of the office of District Attorney and a grievous abuse of discretion under color of law and may not be allowed to go without reprimand or any other suitable punishment by his peers in this profession.
_______(Signed)____________________
Paul L. Nally
========================================
STATE BAR OF GEORGIA
May 30, 2000
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Paul Nally
3667 Hwy 140 NE
Rydal, GA 30171-1302
Re: Grievance filed against Mr. Thomas Joseph Campbell, Bar # 106950
415 Pisgah Way, Calhoun, GA 30701
Dear Mr. Nally:
Enclosed is a copy of Mr. Campbell's response to your grievance. At this time I invite you to rebut the response and add any additional facts to the file that you believe may be relevant.
Please send your response no later than June 17, 2000.
Thank you for your cooperation during the informal investigation of this grievance.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Kellyn O. McGee
Grievance Counsel
KOM/chp
cc: Thomas Joseph Campbell
========================================
May 24,2000
State Bar of Georgia
Office of General Counsel
800 The Hurt Building
50 Hurt Plaza
Atlanta, GA 30303
Attn: Kellyn 0. McGee, Grievance Counsel
RE: Grievance filed by Paul L. Nally Rydal, GA Dated April 29, 2000
Dear Ms. McGee:
This letter is pursuant to your notification of May 15, 2000 concerning the above referenced matter which I can only dignify by this letter of response. It is apparent to me that the modus operandi when Mr. Nally is dissatisfied with an attorney’s action is to file a very bogus claim or grievance. First and foremost, his claim of “discourteous conduct before the grand jury, April session�� did not occur because he never appeared before the grand jury nor was he subpoenaed to come before the grand jury by our office. Therefore, based on the written allegations of his grievance form it is without merit and is lacking in any substance whatsoever and should be dismissed.
I will take an opportunity to address the factual allegations and state to you that the basic facts as outlined in Mr. Nally “averment�� are accurate; however, the numerous conclusionary statements and various libelous allegations are totally baseless. The statement of facts does have one glaring omission and that is that on the Thursday of grand jury, he surreptitiously attempted to gain access to the grand jury by advising the security personnel on the third floor of the courthouse that he was there to appear before the grand jury and was allowed to be standing by to go into the grand jury when he was escorted by security personnel while I was inside the grand jury room back into the waiting area. Once I discovered that he was there I met with Mr. Nally and he served me with a civil complaint of some nature which, by the way, has been summarily dismissed by a Superior Court Judge subsequent to its filing and I did arrange to have another copy upon his request delivered to the grand jury bailiff in order that the foreperson of grand jury could be served with that civil complaint, also as he requested. The security personnel were present and at that time and can verify that I was courteous and respectful to Mr. Nally even while he was trying to sue me and remove me from my constitutional duties of advising the grand jury which was the basic allegation of this now dismissed complaint.
The basic position that I have is that under the constitution and the laws of the State of Georgia the elected district attorney is the legal advisor for the grand juries of their circuit and no other attorney can advise the grand jury. In O.C.G.A. §15-18-6 in subsection 2 and 4 it is clear that the district attorney of whom I am elected for the Cherokee Judicial Circuit is the only person that can present matters to the grand jury and that can draw up presentments. Mr. Nally is correct that he did not give me copy of his paperwork; however, I did receive a copy from the appropriate persons and I reviewed same and did legal research to determine if his allegations concerning the school board not holding a hearing on a local controversy was a violation of oath of office. This was done only in furtherance of my lawful duties. I am enclosing for your information a copy of the paperwork that Mr. Nally was purporting to use to become the prosecutor pro se before Bartow County Grand Jury, April Term 2000. This paperwork is a clear indication that he was attempting to present a criminal case on his own and outside the knowledge of the elected prosecutor (myself).
Thank you for your time and consideration of this letter and if you need anything further, please let me know. Hopefully you will agree with me that there is no basis to proceed further. Finally, pursuant to your instructions in your letter please find enclosed two additional copies of this response to Mr. Nally’s grievance.
Sincerely yours,
T. Joseph Campbell
District Attorney
========================================
June 10, 2000
Ms. Kellyn 0. McGee
State Bar of Georgia
Office of The General Counsel
800 The Hurt Building
50 Hurt Plaza
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Ms. McGee:
Thank you for the opportunity to file this rebuttal.
Relative to the instant matter, the duties of District Attorneys are listed as follows:
(A) Under our Constitution
The paramount duties owed to the citizens of this State by all government agencies and public officials, that are set forth in our Constitution, are the protection of person and property and providing for the impartial, complete and equal protection of the laws. Art. I, Sec. I, par. II.
Additionally, in Art. I, Sec. I, par. XII, "No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person's own cause in any of the courts of this state."
(B) Under Statutes
O.C.G.A. 15-18-2 provides that the District Attorney shall take the following oath:
"I do swear that I will faithfully and impartially and without fear, favor, or affection discharge my duties as district attorney and will take only my lawful compensation. So help me God."
Of particular import in this case is the phrase “discharge my duties�� .
O.C.G.A. 15-18-6 Duties of district attorney (as applicable herein)
The duties of the district attorneys within their respective circuits are:
(2) To attend on the grand juries, advise them in relation to matters of law, and swear and examine witnesses before them;
(10) To assist victims and witnesses of crimes through the complexities of the criminal justice system and ensure the victims of crimes are apprised of the rights afforded them under the law; and.
(11) To perform such other duties as are or may be required by law or which necessarily appertain to their office.
These duties are mandated to the State and its agents, and should not require enforcement by any citizen. This protectable property belongs to every citizen as a matter of right, they are literally the "property" of each citizen, and may only be ignored or refused by the agents of this government at their own peril. These duties should be as well known by every agent of this State as their own name. After all, they have been secured with a terrible price.
The reason that I was disallowed my constitutional appearance before the Grand Jury is precisely the crux of this complaint.
I shall take a moment to address the reference to a "surreptitious attempt" to gain entry to the Grand Jury.
To begin, no citizen needs the permission of a District Attorney to petition a Grand Jury for the redress of a grievance, as that right is inalienable, recognized, and guaranteed by our Constitution, Article I, sec. I, par. XII. Perhaps it would behoove the Learned Counsel to audit a course in Constitutional Law.
As to that incident of the Thursday mentioned, I did go to the third floor of the courthouse and informed the security personnel present that I needed to see the District Attorney and the Foreman of the Grand Jury, not that I had business with the entire Jury. The purpose for the visit was to personally serve the named individuals with a copy of my " Petition for Rule of Officers of The Superior Court of Bartow County, Georgia" which I calculated to be the least disruptive and embarrassing procedure to follow.
I was not "escorted" anywhere by any Court personnel, rather, after informing the Grand Jury Bailiff of my request, I was asked to wait in the well of the courthouse until I could be seen.
As I waited, leaning against the rail of the well, Mr. Campbell came out and placed his hands on the rail beside me and asked, in a gruff but low voice, the tonal inflection of which was unmistakable, "Mr. Nally, did you not understand what I told you Tuesday?" To which I replied "Yes, sir. I'm not here for that, I'm just here to serve you with process.", and handed him his copy of the petition. "I also need to serve the Foreman as well, when he has a minute." At this point, Mr. Campbell seemed somewhat befuddled, kind'a like a possum in headlights, if you know what I mean, then he stepped away, flipping through the pages, mumbling to himself something about ". .don't understand . . serving me . .". After a few minutes he seemed to regain his composure and started back into the Jury area and told me to hand the Foreman's copies to the Bailiff and he would see that they were handed to the Foreman. I did as instructed and left the courthouse. Yes, there were security personnel present, over in the corner at their desk, but not within easy earshot of everything that was said by either of us; although I did not speak in as subdued a volume as Mr. Campbell.
Now, that having been said, I'm the one perplexed as to the allegation of "surreptitiousness". A copy of the Petition and Order are attached herewith.
As to his allegation that I am trying to "remove him from advising the Grand Jury" is now both correct and lawful, but only in the context of my presentation, not that of any other citizen or case, and certainly not at the time of this instance. I fully expected the Grand Jury to inquire of Mr. Campbell, as to any question of law once I had finished with the presentation of evidence. Now, however, I would much rather the Jury be advised by an assistant State's Attorney General, who may also provide legal advice to the Grand Jury in the event of the disability of the District Attorney. I can think of no greater disability than the apparent cavorting with a societal enemy.
It should be noted that, by his skillful use of language, he implies that he had a private communication with one or more of those charged with malfeasant conduct, in particular, Mr. Dave Stephens. This, in and of itself, is not very meaningful. However, he goes further to state that after he received the documents, he did further legal research in furtherance of his lawful duty.
This begets the questions, why did he not bother to contact me and ask for a meeting and go over the volumes of documentary evidence that I have in my possession? Is it not his duty under O.C.G.A. 15-18-6 to assist the victims of crime rather than the perpetrators? Or does that law apply only when the offender is not affluent or otherwise a "respected" member of the "good old boy click"? Should he not have availed himself of every conceivable piece of information to make the proper determination as would be expected of a reasonable and prudent man? Is Mr. Campbell now admitting incompetence as well as his tortuous conduct before the Grand Jury? Is he now admitting of performing private legal counseling for one accused of criminal conduct? Just what does the totality of his conduct in this matter bespeak? Instead of using his harsh courtroom manner at our first meeting of Monday morning and again on Thursday afternoon, why didn't he schedule a discussion with me of the case law research of which he had availed himself and learned of the evidence which I had to produce?
It has been held that one duty of a district attorney is " . . to use in his argument all his ability and skill in presenting the case as made by the pleadings and the evidence, still it is under no circumstances his duty either to go outside of the case, and state facts not in evidence, or to appeal to the passions or prejudices of the jury." Cliett v. State, 46 Ga. App. 315, 167 S.E. 610 (1933). This phrase, "As made by the pleadings and the evidence", is something that he chose to ignore.
The truth of that meeting, however, does not lie in the name or person of Mr. Dave Stephens, but rather someone else. In Mr. Stephens' own words when I interviewed him on Thursday morning, June 8, 2000, he stated, " It wasn't me, maybe Mr. Pettit or someone else.", meaning H. Boyd Pettit, III. This investigative body, already familiar with Mr. Pettit, should require Mr. Campbell to reveal the name(s) and the nature of the conversation with the individual(s), and should require it under oath or require him to state it in his place. Then confirm it by deposing anyone he mentions. Not just the court personnel referenced by Mr. Campbell, but the individual members of the Grand Jury as well. The concept of "clear and convincing evidence" necessarily requires such procedure in the pursuit of truth, and I respectfully request, in that pursuit, that at least letters of inquiry be sent to each and every person involved.
Note too the fact that Mr. Campbell has made several defensive pleadings but has not supported even one of them with a statutory or case law cite or a reference to any documentary evidence in this case which could justify his course of conduct in light of the above mentioned duties required by the Constitution. He has ignored the provisions of O.C.G.A. 15-18-5 that provides the framework for others to fill his place. Has he explained how his partisanship in the instant case, which is at variance with that held in the case of Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App. 61, 185 S.E. 131 (1936), affirmed, 184 Ga. 164, 190 S.E. 582 (1937), adds any sense of protection for citizens from the apparent corruption of "pork-barrel politicians" or enhances the respect to which his chosen profession strives? Neither has he shown how such conduct does not constitute a willful violation of his official oath of office.
Additionally, he fails to explain how his conduct was in furtherance of the concept of due process which was affirmed by our US Supreme Court when it held in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18) (1976), " The 'right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.' Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).��
A more prudent and respectful procedure would have been for him to ask the Grand Jury to hear both of our arguments as to the merits of hearing the case presentation. This would have allowed the Jury and the District Attorney to provide minimum due process and let the Jury make its own decision, which is after all, their constitutional duty. Even agreeing to hear the case presentation would be no guarantee of a presentment. But at least a "meaningful time and meaningful manner" would have been served.
It is clear and without question that Mr. Campbell has acted outside the scope of his ministerial and quasi-judicial duty. His conduct is, and has caused on the part of the Grand Jury, a tortuous deprivation of Constitutional guarantees and is the most heinous form of disrespect.
This conduct clearly indicates that this was no mere disagreement between parties on interpretations of law, but a clearly defined attempt to thwart a criminal investigation being performed by one constitutionally recognized with the authority to proceed therewith, and constitutes the District Attorney's encroachment into the jurisdiction of the Grand Jury, as both judge and jury of facts of which he had no, or limited, knowledge which is also grievously disrespectful.
Since his answer in no way reflects an amiable or contrite heart, seeking even a modicum of forgiveness, he is at the worst, deserving of impeachment and prosecution for willful violation of Official Oath of Office. At the very least, it is deserving of the strongest rebuke of his peers as possible.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Paul L. Nally
========================================
June 30, 20000
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Paul Nally
3667 Hwy 140 NE
Rydal, GA 30171-1302
Re: Grievance filed against Mr. Thomas Joseph Campbell, Bar # 106950 415 Pisgah Way, Calhoun, GA 30701
Dear Mr. Nally:
I have carefully reviewed all of the correspondence and documents in your file regarding your grievance. At this time I must inform you that the conduct alleged in your grievance does not fall within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Disciplinary Board has authority to investigate grievances that state conduct falling within one or more of 74 specific ethical standards.
No further action will be taken on this matter. Thank you for your cooperation during this informal investigation.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Kellyn O. McGee
Grievance Counsel
Please keep in mind as you read this that at no time did the SBofGa allow me to speak verbally, nor did it permit me to present the evidence or witnesses to prove that Joe Campbell had committed two felonies! The SBofGa denied me, and many others, of the right to due process and denied you the right to the evidence of any man in our society!
These documents have been concealed from your knowledge by state law. It is past time that you now know the truth regardless of what happens to me.
========================================
Paul L. Nally
3667 Reinhardt College Parkway
Pine Log, Georgia 30171-1302
Pln@innerx.net
(770) 386-1171
April 29, 2000
Ms. Kellyn 0. McGee
State Bar of Georgia
Office of The General Counsel
800 The Hurt Building
50 Hurt Plaza
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Ms. McGee:
Please find enclosed my grievance form and averment in the matter of Mr. T. Joseph Campbell, Esq., District Attorney, Cherokee Judicial Circuit, Georgia.
Also, could you please explain the reason for the various provisions of the Canon of Ethics containing discipline statements if the inquiry of the State Bar is restricted to the seventy-four standards of conduct.
Should anyone desire that this averment be sworn or require an interview, please let me know and I will make arrangements to be at their pleasure.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Paul L. Nally
Enc.
cc: Joseph Campbell
James E. Jarrett
========================================
STATE BAR OF GEORGIA
GRIEVANCE
Please type or print legibly.
YOUR NAME: _______________Paul L. Nally________________________
MAILING ADDRESS: _3667 Hwy 140 NE___Rydal____Georgia____30171-1302_
Street or P. 0. Box City State Zip
YOUR PHONE NUMBERS: (W) ______(770) 387-3679__________________
(H) ___(770) 386-1171_____________________
NAME OF THE ATTORNEY: _____Mr.. T. Joseph Campbell_________________
Fill out a separate form for each attorney. Do not list law firms.
ADDRESS OF THE ATTORNEY: ___135 W. Cherokee Ave. Suite 368 Cartersville, Georgia 30120______
State what the attorney has done or has not done which causes you to fill out this report
________1. Discourteous conduct before the Grand Jury, April Session_______
_________________________________________________________________
If more space is needed, please attach other pages. Please do not write on the back.
Return to:
State Bar of Georgia
SIGNATURE; ____(Signed by Paul Nally)___
========================================
A v e r m e n t
IN RE Joseph Campbell
In the matter of a criminal investigation performed by Paul L. Nally, proceeding under color of law pursuant to the authority of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, Art. I, Sec. I, par. XII, Mr. Joseph Campbell, District Attorney for the Cherokee Judicial Circuit has committed a breach of the Standards of Conduct of the State Bar of Georgia, to wit:
Discourteous conduct before a judicial tribunal.
On April 24, 2000, Paul L. Nally met with the District Attorney, Mr. T. Joseph Campbell, at about 8:50 AM in the foyer of the District Attorney's offices at the courthouse in Cartersville, Georgia.
In this meeting Nally informed Mr. Campbell of his desire to meet with the Grand Jury for the purpose of proceeding with the prosecution of a criminal matter involving the members of the Bartow County Board of Education under O.C.G.A. 16-10-1, Willful Violation of Official Oath of Office and requested that he so inform the Grand Jury.
Upon hearing Nally's statement, Mr. Campbell informed Nally that he had already seen Nally's paperwork (non of which was provided directly by Nally) and that Nally did not have a criminal case and, further, Nally needed to proceed in the Superior Court with a Mandamus. He further stated that he was the official legal advisor to the Grand Jury and that he would inform them of Nally's request, but that he would also inform them of his position on the matter. Nally then left.
It should be noted that the only "paperwork" he could have possibly had in his possession would have been a copy of Nally's affidavit alleging the elements of the crime and not the evidentiary material which was to be submitted to the Grand Jury in support thereof. A copy of the affidavit and the statutorily required notice to public officers had been mailed to all named defendants of the Local Board of Education.
On Tuesday afternoon, about 5:10 PM, Mr. Campbell called Nally at home to advise him that he had so informed the Grand Jury and that they had agreed with his position and had taken the position that there was no criminal matter into which they needed to inquire. Therefore no need existed for them to meet with Nally during this term.
Neither Mr. Campbell nor the Grand Jury provided Nally with notice that the matter was to be considered at any date certain, therefore Nally had no proper due process opportunity to present any argument as to the merits of having his case heard.
Such blatant and inexcusable conduct on the part of this District Attorney in this particular matter is, at least, a clear contravention of Standard 50. Said conduct is a discourteous act to both the Grand Jury, which was sitting as constitutional judges in a tribunal under the authority of the Constitution of Georgia, Art. I, Sec. I, para. XI(a), and Nally, the victim of the criminal conduct. This conduct is also a tyrannical abuse of the power of the office of District Attorney and a grievous abuse of discretion under color of law and may not be allowed to go without reprimand or any other suitable punishment by his peers in this profession.
_______(Signed)____________________
Paul L. Nally
========================================
STATE BAR OF GEORGIA
May 30, 2000
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Paul Nally
3667 Hwy 140 NE
Rydal, GA 30171-1302
Re: Grievance filed against Mr. Thomas Joseph Campbell, Bar # 106950
415 Pisgah Way, Calhoun, GA 30701
Dear Mr. Nally:
Enclosed is a copy of Mr. Campbell's response to your grievance. At this time I invite you to rebut the response and add any additional facts to the file that you believe may be relevant.
Please send your response no later than June 17, 2000.
Thank you for your cooperation during the informal investigation of this grievance.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Kellyn O. McGee
Grievance Counsel
KOM/chp
cc: Thomas Joseph Campbell
========================================
May 24,2000
State Bar of Georgia
Office of General Counsel
800 The Hurt Building
50 Hurt Plaza
Atlanta, GA 30303
Attn: Kellyn 0. McGee, Grievance Counsel
RE: Grievance filed by Paul L. Nally Rydal, GA Dated April 29, 2000
Dear Ms. McGee:
This letter is pursuant to your notification of May 15, 2000 concerning the above referenced matter which I can only dignify by this letter of response. It is apparent to me that the modus operandi when Mr. Nally is dissatisfied with an attorney’s action is to file a very bogus claim or grievance. First and foremost, his claim of “discourteous conduct before the grand jury, April session�� did not occur because he never appeared before the grand jury nor was he subpoenaed to come before the grand jury by our office. Therefore, based on the written allegations of his grievance form it is without merit and is lacking in any substance whatsoever and should be dismissed.
I will take an opportunity to address the factual allegations and state to you that the basic facts as outlined in Mr. Nally “averment�� are accurate; however, the numerous conclusionary statements and various libelous allegations are totally baseless. The statement of facts does have one glaring omission and that is that on the Thursday of grand jury, he surreptitiously attempted to gain access to the grand jury by advising the security personnel on the third floor of the courthouse that he was there to appear before the grand jury and was allowed to be standing by to go into the grand jury when he was escorted by security personnel while I was inside the grand jury room back into the waiting area. Once I discovered that he was there I met with Mr. Nally and he served me with a civil complaint of some nature which, by the way, has been summarily dismissed by a Superior Court Judge subsequent to its filing and I did arrange to have another copy upon his request delivered to the grand jury bailiff in order that the foreperson of grand jury could be served with that civil complaint, also as he requested. The security personnel were present and at that time and can verify that I was courteous and respectful to Mr. Nally even while he was trying to sue me and remove me from my constitutional duties of advising the grand jury which was the basic allegation of this now dismissed complaint.
The basic position that I have is that under the constitution and the laws of the State of Georgia the elected district attorney is the legal advisor for the grand juries of their circuit and no other attorney can advise the grand jury. In O.C.G.A. §15-18-6 in subsection 2 and 4 it is clear that the district attorney of whom I am elected for the Cherokee Judicial Circuit is the only person that can present matters to the grand jury and that can draw up presentments. Mr. Nally is correct that he did not give me copy of his paperwork; however, I did receive a copy from the appropriate persons and I reviewed same and did legal research to determine if his allegations concerning the school board not holding a hearing on a local controversy was a violation of oath of office. This was done only in furtherance of my lawful duties. I am enclosing for your information a copy of the paperwork that Mr. Nally was purporting to use to become the prosecutor pro se before Bartow County Grand Jury, April Term 2000. This paperwork is a clear indication that he was attempting to present a criminal case on his own and outside the knowledge of the elected prosecutor (myself).
Thank you for your time and consideration of this letter and if you need anything further, please let me know. Hopefully you will agree with me that there is no basis to proceed further. Finally, pursuant to your instructions in your letter please find enclosed two additional copies of this response to Mr. Nally’s grievance.
Sincerely yours,
T. Joseph Campbell
District Attorney
========================================
June 10, 2000
Ms. Kellyn 0. McGee
State Bar of Georgia
Office of The General Counsel
800 The Hurt Building
50 Hurt Plaza
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Ms. McGee:
Thank you for the opportunity to file this rebuttal.
Relative to the instant matter, the duties of District Attorneys are listed as follows:
(A) Under our Constitution
The paramount duties owed to the citizens of this State by all government agencies and public officials, that are set forth in our Constitution, are the protection of person and property and providing for the impartial, complete and equal protection of the laws. Art. I, Sec. I, par. II.
Additionally, in Art. I, Sec. I, par. XII, "No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person's own cause in any of the courts of this state."
(B) Under Statutes
O.C.G.A. 15-18-2 provides that the District Attorney shall take the following oath:
"I do swear that I will faithfully and impartially and without fear, favor, or affection discharge my duties as district attorney and will take only my lawful compensation. So help me God."
Of particular import in this case is the phrase “discharge my duties�� .
O.C.G.A. 15-18-6 Duties of district attorney (as applicable herein)
The duties of the district attorneys within their respective circuits are:
(2) To attend on the grand juries, advise them in relation to matters of law, and swear and examine witnesses before them;
(10) To assist victims and witnesses of crimes through the complexities of the criminal justice system and ensure the victims of crimes are apprised of the rights afforded them under the law; and.
(11) To perform such other duties as are or may be required by law or which necessarily appertain to their office.
These duties are mandated to the State and its agents, and should not require enforcement by any citizen. This protectable property belongs to every citizen as a matter of right, they are literally the "property" of each citizen, and may only be ignored or refused by the agents of this government at their own peril. These duties should be as well known by every agent of this State as their own name. After all, they have been secured with a terrible price.
The reason that I was disallowed my constitutional appearance before the Grand Jury is precisely the crux of this complaint.
I shall take a moment to address the reference to a "surreptitious attempt" to gain entry to the Grand Jury.
To begin, no citizen needs the permission of a District Attorney to petition a Grand Jury for the redress of a grievance, as that right is inalienable, recognized, and guaranteed by our Constitution, Article I, sec. I, par. XII. Perhaps it would behoove the Learned Counsel to audit a course in Constitutional Law.
As to that incident of the Thursday mentioned, I did go to the third floor of the courthouse and informed the security personnel present that I needed to see the District Attorney and the Foreman of the Grand Jury, not that I had business with the entire Jury. The purpose for the visit was to personally serve the named individuals with a copy of my " Petition for Rule of Officers of The Superior Court of Bartow County, Georgia" which I calculated to be the least disruptive and embarrassing procedure to follow.
I was not "escorted" anywhere by any Court personnel, rather, after informing the Grand Jury Bailiff of my request, I was asked to wait in the well of the courthouse until I could be seen.
As I waited, leaning against the rail of the well, Mr. Campbell came out and placed his hands on the rail beside me and asked, in a gruff but low voice, the tonal inflection of which was unmistakable, "Mr. Nally, did you not understand what I told you Tuesday?" To which I replied "Yes, sir. I'm not here for that, I'm just here to serve you with process.", and handed him his copy of the petition. "I also need to serve the Foreman as well, when he has a minute." At this point, Mr. Campbell seemed somewhat befuddled, kind'a like a possum in headlights, if you know what I mean, then he stepped away, flipping through the pages, mumbling to himself something about ". .don't understand . . serving me . .". After a few minutes he seemed to regain his composure and started back into the Jury area and told me to hand the Foreman's copies to the Bailiff and he would see that they were handed to the Foreman. I did as instructed and left the courthouse. Yes, there were security personnel present, over in the corner at their desk, but not within easy earshot of everything that was said by either of us; although I did not speak in as subdued a volume as Mr. Campbell.
Now, that having been said, I'm the one perplexed as to the allegation of "surreptitiousness". A copy of the Petition and Order are attached herewith.
As to his allegation that I am trying to "remove him from advising the Grand Jury" is now both correct and lawful, but only in the context of my presentation, not that of any other citizen or case, and certainly not at the time of this instance. I fully expected the Grand Jury to inquire of Mr. Campbell, as to any question of law once I had finished with the presentation of evidence. Now, however, I would much rather the Jury be advised by an assistant State's Attorney General, who may also provide legal advice to the Grand Jury in the event of the disability of the District Attorney. I can think of no greater disability than the apparent cavorting with a societal enemy.
It should be noted that, by his skillful use of language, he implies that he had a private communication with one or more of those charged with malfeasant conduct, in particular, Mr. Dave Stephens. This, in and of itself, is not very meaningful. However, he goes further to state that after he received the documents, he did further legal research in furtherance of his lawful duty.
This begets the questions, why did he not bother to contact me and ask for a meeting and go over the volumes of documentary evidence that I have in my possession? Is it not his duty under O.C.G.A. 15-18-6 to assist the victims of crime rather than the perpetrators? Or does that law apply only when the offender is not affluent or otherwise a "respected" member of the "good old boy click"? Should he not have availed himself of every conceivable piece of information to make the proper determination as would be expected of a reasonable and prudent man? Is Mr. Campbell now admitting incompetence as well as his tortuous conduct before the Grand Jury? Is he now admitting of performing private legal counseling for one accused of criminal conduct? Just what does the totality of his conduct in this matter bespeak? Instead of using his harsh courtroom manner at our first meeting of Monday morning and again on Thursday afternoon, why didn't he schedule a discussion with me of the case law research of which he had availed himself and learned of the evidence which I had to produce?
It has been held that one duty of a district attorney is " . . to use in his argument all his ability and skill in presenting the case as made by the pleadings and the evidence, still it is under no circumstances his duty either to go outside of the case, and state facts not in evidence, or to appeal to the passions or prejudices of the jury." Cliett v. State, 46 Ga. App. 315, 167 S.E. 610 (1933). This phrase, "As made by the pleadings and the evidence", is something that he chose to ignore.
The truth of that meeting, however, does not lie in the name or person of Mr. Dave Stephens, but rather someone else. In Mr. Stephens' own words when I interviewed him on Thursday morning, June 8, 2000, he stated, " It wasn't me, maybe Mr. Pettit or someone else.", meaning H. Boyd Pettit, III. This investigative body, already familiar with Mr. Pettit, should require Mr. Campbell to reveal the name(s) and the nature of the conversation with the individual(s), and should require it under oath or require him to state it in his place. Then confirm it by deposing anyone he mentions. Not just the court personnel referenced by Mr. Campbell, but the individual members of the Grand Jury as well. The concept of "clear and convincing evidence" necessarily requires such procedure in the pursuit of truth, and I respectfully request, in that pursuit, that at least letters of inquiry be sent to each and every person involved.
Note too the fact that Mr. Campbell has made several defensive pleadings but has not supported even one of them with a statutory or case law cite or a reference to any documentary evidence in this case which could justify his course of conduct in light of the above mentioned duties required by the Constitution. He has ignored the provisions of O.C.G.A. 15-18-5 that provides the framework for others to fill his place. Has he explained how his partisanship in the instant case, which is at variance with that held in the case of Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App. 61, 185 S.E. 131 (1936), affirmed, 184 Ga. 164, 190 S.E. 582 (1937), adds any sense of protection for citizens from the apparent corruption of "pork-barrel politicians" or enhances the respect to which his chosen profession strives? Neither has he shown how such conduct does not constitute a willful violation of his official oath of office.
Additionally, he fails to explain how his conduct was in furtherance of the concept of due process which was affirmed by our US Supreme Court when it held in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18) (1976), " The 'right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.' Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).��
A more prudent and respectful procedure would have been for him to ask the Grand Jury to hear both of our arguments as to the merits of hearing the case presentation. This would have allowed the Jury and the District Attorney to provide minimum due process and let the Jury make its own decision, which is after all, their constitutional duty. Even agreeing to hear the case presentation would be no guarantee of a presentment. But at least a "meaningful time and meaningful manner" would have been served.
It is clear and without question that Mr. Campbell has acted outside the scope of his ministerial and quasi-judicial duty. His conduct is, and has caused on the part of the Grand Jury, a tortuous deprivation of Constitutional guarantees and is the most heinous form of disrespect.
This conduct clearly indicates that this was no mere disagreement between parties on interpretations of law, but a clearly defined attempt to thwart a criminal investigation being performed by one constitutionally recognized with the authority to proceed therewith, and constitutes the District Attorney's encroachment into the jurisdiction of the Grand Jury, as both judge and jury of facts of which he had no, or limited, knowledge which is also grievously disrespectful.
Since his answer in no way reflects an amiable or contrite heart, seeking even a modicum of forgiveness, he is at the worst, deserving of impeachment and prosecution for willful violation of Official Oath of Office. At the very least, it is deserving of the strongest rebuke of his peers as possible.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Paul L. Nally
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June 30, 20000
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Paul Nally
3667 Hwy 140 NE
Rydal, GA 30171-1302
Re: Grievance filed against Mr. Thomas Joseph Campbell, Bar # 106950 415 Pisgah Way, Calhoun, GA 30701
Dear Mr. Nally:
I have carefully reviewed all of the correspondence and documents in your file regarding your grievance. At this time I must inform you that the conduct alleged in your grievance does not fall within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Georgia. The State Disciplinary Board has authority to investigate grievances that state conduct falling within one or more of 74 specific ethical standards.
No further action will be taken on this matter. Thank you for your cooperation during this informal investigation.
Sincerely,
(Signed)
Kellyn O. McGee
Grievance Counsel